An agent choosing between various actions tends to take the one with the lowest loss. But this choice is arguably too rigid (not adaptive) to be useful in complex situations, e.g. where explorationexploitation trade-off is relevant, or in creative task solving. Here we study an agent that-given a certain average utility invested into adaptation-chooses his actions via a probabilities obtained through optimizing the entropy. As we argue, entropy minimization corresponds to a risk-averse agent, whereas a risk-seeking agent will maximize the entropy. The entropy minimization can (under certain conditions) recover the ǫ-greedy probabilities known in reinforced learning. We show that the entropy minimization-in contrast to its maximization-leads to rudimentary forms of intelligent behavior: (i) the agent accounts for extreme events, especially when he did not invest much into adaptation. (ii) He chooses the action related to lesser loss (lesser of two evils) when confronted with two actions with comparable losses. (iii) The agent is subject to effects similar to cognitive dissonance and frustration. Neither of these features are shown by the risk-seeking agent whose probabilities are given by the maximum entropy. Mathematically, the difference between entropy maximization versus its minimization corresponds with maximizing a convex function (in a convex domain, i.e.convex programming) versus minimizing it (concave programming).
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider an agent who has to choose between a number of mutually exclusive actions A 1 , ..., A n . Each action A k corresponds with the loss ε k (or the utility u k = −ε k ). The basic tenet of the decision theory is that the agent ought to choose the action that minimizes the loss (or maximizes the utility) [1] . In terms of probabilities p k for various actions (p k ≥ 0, n k=1 p k = 1), this amounts to taking the action ℓ related to the least loss (if it exists and is available):
p ℓ = 1, p k =ℓ = 0, ε ℓ < ε k =ℓ , k = 1, ..., n.
There are however situations, where ε k may change as a results of actions taken [2] . This is the case in reinforcement learning, where ε k refer to preliminary losses [3] . Here are further examples for this situation that also point against choosing (1) . A scientist has to decide on several alternative directions for solving a research problem. Each direction k has its own loss ε k , e.g. the inverse likelihood of solving the problem. The probabilities p k can refer to the fraction of the overall time invested direction k. It would not be wise to spent all the time on the lowest-loss direction, e.g. because investing time in a research direction may change its outcome and the associated loss. This example corresponds with the exploration-exploitation dilemma known in adaptive (biological, organizational, social) systems; see [4, 5] for reviews. Exploring possibilities that seem inferior from a local viewpoint may provide advantages on the long run. Exploitation (in the narrow sense) makes the choice that does seem optimal at the moment of choice. Broader exploitation scenarios do account for adaptivity, but still concentrates on the most useful possibilities [5] . The dilemma is also met in creative problem solving [6] [7] [8] . There are conceptually simple tasks which are nevertheless not easy to solve in practice, because solving them via the least loss (implied by the statement of the problem and/or the previous experience of the solver) is a dead-end [6] [7] [8] . This Einstellung effect is one of the main hindrances of human creativity [6] [7] [8] . Creative tasks can be solved only if (subjectively) less probable ways are looked at [6, 7] 1 .
The message of these examples can be formalized by noting that (1) will not change if updated via the Bayes rule. Assume that there is a new evidence E on the situation (e.g. about new values of ε k ) with probability Pr(E|k) conditioned over the action k. Updating the probabilities via the Bayes rule
and using (1) we get p k = p ′ k . The same conclusion on non-adaptive probabilities is obtained for a class of non-Bayesian rules [9] , where the evidence E refers to probabilities {q k } of another agent that advises the first one.
How to assign prior probabilities so as to avoid the strictly deterministic (1)? Such probabilities should hold a natural constraint that actions related to more loss are getting smaller probabilities. Two ad hoc solutions are especially simple: one can account only for the sub-optimal action, or for all possible actions with the same (small) probability. In the reinforcement learning the latter prior probability is known as the ǫ-greedy [3] . It is preferable to have a regular method of choosing non-deterministic probabilities, which will reflect people's attitudes towards the decision making in an uncertain situation, and which will include the above ad hoc solutions as particular cases.
Here we explore the possibility of defining the prior probabilities via optimizing (maximizing or minimizing) the risk; see [10] for interesting informal discussions on risk. We assume that the agent first decides how much average utility E he agrees to invest into adaptation by going into non-optimal-in the sense of not holding (1)-behavior. Given E-and the constraint that actions related to more loss get lesser probability-we argue below that maximizing (minimizing) the risk amounts to maximizing (minimizing) the entropy − n k=1 p k ln p k . We study both minimization and maximization of risk, because people demonstrate both type of behavior [11] . Gambling experiments with monetary outcomes show that when all outcomes are gains (i.e. ε k < 0) people tend to be risk-aversive [11] . In contrast, when all outcomes are losses (ε k > 0) people tend to be risk-seeking [11] 2 . When comparing two types of agents, we shall show that they indeed relate to everyday usage of cautious versus risky (i.e. careless). The entropy-minimizing agent tends to account for extreme events, whereas the entropy-maximizing agent ignores them. The extent to which the extreme events are accounted for by the entropy minimizing agent depends on the amount of utility invested into adaptation: investing more leads to accounting less. As we argue below, this closely relates with the notion of cognitive dissonance [44] . Another feature of the cognitive dissonance is that the entropy-minimizing agent can abruptly change the action probabilities (which provide comparable minima of entropy) as a result of a small change of E. Also, when confronting with two actions with different, but comparable losses, the entropy-minimizing agent tends to select the one with a smaller loss (chooses the lesser of two evils), while the entropy-maximizing agent simply does not distinguish between them. The important point is that for a risk-minizing agent (which does a constrainted minimization of a concave function in a convex domain) choosing the probabilities of actions means selecting between several local minima. In contrast, the risk-seeking agent has always a unique and well-defined probabilistic solution that results from minimizing a convex function [12] . The above features of the entropy minimizing agent may be related to human tendencies of planning directed towards self-preservation. We relate them to a rudimentary form of intelligence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses risk and its relation with entropy. Next two sections present details of entropy optimization. Section V compares entropy maximization and minimization scenarios from the viewpoint of the agent's behavior. We summarize in the last section.
II. RISK AND ENTROPY

A. Risk and majorization
We return to the problem stated in the beginning of this paper: the agent knows that he cannot always choose the action related to the least loss (or the maximal utility), because this is not adaptive. Hence he decides to act probabilistically 3 , and implements two contraints. First, he invests into the adaptivity the utility E − min k [ε k ], where
where p k are (unknown) probabilities. Second, actions related to less loss get higher probability:
Recall that losses are negative utilities. We work with losses, since this makes explicit the analogy with statistical physics, where the loss corresponds to energy, and the natural tendency is to minimize the energy. In particular, (4) is the standard condition of physical stability [13] . Relations between statistical physics and decision theory are mentioned in [14] . Ref. [15] discusses the maximum entropy method for elicitation of losses (utilities) from an incomplete data. We order the losses and probabilities as
Note that the inequalities in (5) between losses are strict, since within the present study coinciding losses mean coinciding actions. Hence once the actions are different (mutually excluding), so should be the losses. Let us now define another candidate probability with the same losses (5) and holding the same constraints (3, 4):
We ask for criteria that should make {p k } n k=1 more preferable than {q k } n k=1 . The well-known criterion of choosing for a smaller average loss obviously does not apply here. However, one can ask whether {p k } n k=1 is less risky than
. The most stringent definition of risk goes via the stochastic dominance condition 4 ; see [1, 16] for reviews. A risk-averse agent can start with the largest possible loss ε n and asks for its p-probability p n to be not larger than the q-probability q n . Next, the p-probability p n + p n−1 of the loss to be larger or equal to ε n−1 is compared with the corresponding q-probability q n + q n−1 etc. We end up with n − 1 conditions
so that if one of them holds strictly, then {p k } n k=1 is less risky than {q k } n k=1 . Note that the same n − 1 conditions (8) emerge with an alternative definition of risk, when the agent maximizes the probability of the best outcome ε 1 etc.
Due to specific orderings (3, 7) the stochastic dominance condition (8) for the considered case coincides with the majorization condition [51] 
In particular, the homogeneous probability q k = 1 n is the most risky one, while {p k } n k=1 = (1, 0, .., 0) is the least risky one. Thus, in the present situation we have a natural correspondence between risk and majorization (homogenity). But generally, the stochastic dominance does differ from majorization [1, 16] .
B. Entropy
According to (8) , the risk amounts to n − 1 different conditions, i.e. it is not a single number 5 . Frequently, these conditions are not met in practice, i.e. for most of practical probabilities neither
. This fact motivated economists to look for simpler measures, so that risky in the sense of stochastic dominance means risky with respect to those measures [17, 18] . However, the inverse does not generally holds: more risky in terms of those measures does not imply the stochastic dominance.
We shall also replace n − 1 conditions (8) by a single measure that holds the following three constraints [52] .
is additive with respect to the index k, and symmetric with respect to any permutation of probabilities, i.e.
is additive with respect to independent composition of probabilities, i.e.
for any two probability sets {p k } and {r l }.
Conditions (i)-(iii) are natural for a risk measure, and they lead to [52] 6 : ψ(p) = −p ln p, up to a positive multiplicative constant that we fixed to 1, and an additive constant that we fixed to 0 [52] . Thus the sought quantity amounts to the entropy
Eq. (10) means that entropy is larger for more risky probability. The expression (11) for the entropy can be recovered via several different axiomatic schemes; see [55] for a review. Thus instead of conditions (8) we shall employ the entropy (11) as a measure of risk 7 . Now the risk-seeking (risk-averse) agent chooses to maximize (minimize) entropy (11) under constraints (3, 4) . The entropy maximization is a well-known method for determination of prior probabilities [22] [23] [24] . This method was developed within statistical physics and it reflects the second law of thermodynamics, i.e. the natural tendency of the entropy to increase in closed systems. The method was also motivated from within the probabilistic inference theory [23, 24] , and applied in group decision making [28] , game theory [29] , where it describes bounded rational agents etc. The entropy maximization was also discussed from the viewpoint of approximate (and causal) reasoning [30] [31] [32] [33] . In social sciences the outcome of the entropy maximization method is know as the logit distribution; see [29] for a short review. Several basic features of entropy were related to the utility maximization in economics [34] [35] [36] .
In contrast, the entropy minimization for a risk-averse agent is compared with a general trend of social and biological systems that create order, i.e. decrease the entropy locally [42, 43] . Formalizations of such processes within statistical physics are less known, but do exist [19, 21] . Below we shall employ results from [21] . Occasionally, aspects of entropy minimization are also discussed in probabilistic inference [25] [26] [27] .
One can look at gambling experiments to see whether human subjects more frequently demonstrate risk-aversion or risk-seeking; see [11] for a review. Experiments show that whenever ε k < 0 (i.e. monetary gains), people predominantly show risk-aversion, while for ε k > 0 (monetary losses) people tend to be risk-seeking [11] . The situation, where both negative and positive ε k 's are possible is unclear. We do not necessarily impose definite-sign ε k 's, hence we shall study below both risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior.
C. Alternative route to constrained entropy optimization
Optimization of entropy (11) under constraint (3) can be done via the optimization of the Lagrange function
6 These conditions are also discussed more recently in [54] . 7 The usage of entropy as a measure of risk was criticized in literature (see e.g. [17] ) on the ground that it depends only on probability and not (also) on the losses ε k . However, we note that the criticisms of [17] is not general, and it certainly does not apply to the situation we consider, where both probabilities {p k } n k=1 and {q k } n k=1 refer to the same losses {ε k } n k=1 . Indeed, the argument of [17] against using the entropy as a measure of risk refers (say) to comparing two situations, where within the first situation the agent gets 10$ and −10$ with probabilities p 1 and p 2 . Within the second situation the agent gets 1000$ and −1000$ with the same probabilities p 1 and p 2 . The entropies here will be the same −p 1 ln p 1 − p 2 ln p 2 , but the risks are obviously different.
whereβ is the Lagrange multiplier that corresponds with E in (3). Following [37] we shall mention an approach that allows to recover directly (12) via few reasonable axioms. This is useful as an alternative (and more direct) route to optimizing entropy under (3).
Let us reinterpret actions A 1 , ..., A n in (1) as events of a classical probability space. One seeks a measure L n (A 1 , p 1 ; ...; A n , p n ) of uncertainty (or risk) that depends on both the probabilities and the corresponding events and that holds the following axioms [37] : (i) L n (A 1 , p 1 ; ...; A n , p n ) is symmetric with respect to any permutation of n elements (z 1 , ..., z n ), where
). (13) This is a natural feature for an uncertainty, where joining to events A 1 and A 2 (thus p 1 + p 2 is the joint probability) leaves the residual uncertainty
p1+p2 ) with conditional probabilities p1 p1+p2 and p2 p1+p2 for A 1 and
.., p n . The three axioms lead to [37] :
where ε k (A k ) is an arbitrary function of A k , andγ is an arbitrary constant. (An irrelevant additive constant was fixed to zero). Interpreting ε k (A k ) as the loss related to A k , and equatingγ =β we revert from (14) to (12) . Eq. (14) and many related results can be proved via the functional equations methods reviewed in [38] . Note, that expressions similar to (14), i.e. a convex combination of entropy and expected loss (minus utility) were proposed in [39, 40] as a measure of risk. Refs. [39, 40] employ this measure for elucidating several controversies in the decision theory. The same measure was axiomatically deduced and studied in [41] . Taking into account the axiomatic development, one can say that the measure of risk (14) expressed by a linear combination of entropy and expected loss does have normative features.
III. PRIOR PROBABILITIES VIA ENTROPY MINIMIZATION
Here we discuss the minimization of entropy (11) under constraints (3, 4); see also [21] in this context. First of all, we note that (4) and (3) are compatible only for
Indeed, we can apply the summation by parts formula
to both sides of (15):
Now (15) follows, because the first (second) term inside square brackets in (17) is positive due to (5) (due to (6)). Using (5, 6) we parametrize the sought probabilities p i as [21] (
It
Note that constrants (4) and (3) define a convex set [12] . We denote this set by S. The same convex set, but in different coordinates is defined via (19) and (21) . We now recall that the entropy S[p] in (11) is a concave function of p = (p 1 , ..., p n ) on S [22] [23] [24] [cf. (10) ]:
Eq. (23) is verified by looking at unconstrained-i.e. without accounting for constraints (4), (3) and (18) with only two non-zero λ α 's that are determined from (3) and from (5) defines a candidate solution for the minimum of entropy. Comparing these solutions with each other one finds the global entropy minimum [21] .
Note that the above concavity argument does not imply that all candidate solutions are local minima with respect to an infinitesimal perturbation that holds (3, 4) 9 . Nevertheless, it is the case that for the present problem all above candidate solutions are local minima; see Appendix A for details. The local minimality is important, because it makes the candidate solutions meaningfull even if they do not provide the global minimum of entropy. Note as well that the overall number of local minima is n(n − 1)/2. Hence choosing the global minimum demands O(n(n − 1)/2) operations. This number scales polynomially with n.
Denote by {α < β} the candidate solution, where only λ α ≡ λ α and λ β = 1 − λ α are non-zero. We get for (21, 22) :
For the minimized entropy we get from (11, 18, 19, 24, 25 )
Now note from (5, 22) that [for α < β]
8 This fact follows from the negativity of the Hessian, but can be shown as well directly: let λ 0 be a local minimum of S[λ] that is not a vertex of S. Then there exist λ 1 and λ 2 , both from S, and both are close to λ 0 so that λ 0 = χλ 1 + (1 − χ)λ 2 , and 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1. Now 
, again a contradiction. 9 As an example consider a sphere intersected by a plane. The part of the plane that is inside of the sphere defines a convex set, and surface of the sphere is a concave function.
Hence within the candidate solution {α < β} we get [see (24) ]
We also obtain from (22-28)
where (30) follows from (29) . According to (30) , S {αβ} is an increasing function of E within each candidate solution {αβ}, hence also for the global minimum. Likewise, one can show from (30) that
i.e. S {αβ} (E) is concave within each candidate solution. Hence the global minimum min 1≤α<β≤n [ S {αβ} (E) ] is also a concave function of E.
Eq. (29) shows that different candidate solutions {αβ} are to be combined to cover the whole possible range of E: ε 1 = ǫ 1 ≤ E ≤ ǫ n . For n = 3 there are two such combinations. The entropies are given as
and where S {αβ} is given by (26) . For n = 4 we have the following solution: {12} ∨ {23} ∨ {34}, {12} ∨ {24}, {13} ∨ {34}, and {14}.
Within the candidate solution {1 n} (e.g. {1 3} for n = 3) the action with the lowest loss ε 1 is prescribed the largest probability, while all other actions have the same probability; see (18) . This is indeed the simplest possible prescription that provides a non-zero probabilities for all utilities and that holds for all possible values of E. The local minimum solution {1 n} coincides with the ǫ-greedy scheme from the reinforcement learning [3] . It is seen to correspond to (at least) a local minimum of entropy. The candidate solution {1 2} refers to the situation, where only the optimal and sub-optimal solutions are accounted for. The valilidty range for this local minimum is restricted by
Thus within the present set-up these two simple schemes of assigning non-deterministic prior probability appear naturally. But in contrast to imposing them ad hoc, these schemes now have their validity conditions. They are weakly (strongly) valid once they are local (global) minima of entropy.
IV. ENTROPY MAXIMIZATION FOR RISK-SEEKING AGENTS
Within the maximum entropy scheme the risk-seeking agent will maximize over probabilities p k the entropy (11) under constraint (21) [22] [23] [24] . It is known that the maximization produces the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities [22] [23] [24] [cf. Footnote 8] 
whereβ is determined from E = n k=1p k ε k ; cf. (3). The sign ofβ coincides with the sign of 1 n n k=1 ε k − E; see (15) . Henceβ ≥ 0, since we assume the validity of (15). Below we recall some of the salient features of (33) and compare them with the entropy minimization scheme 10 . Note that the local minimum {α β} (and its probabilities) is not susceptible to changes of ε γ (where γ > β) that take place under a constant E; see (24) (25) (26) (27) . This differs from the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (11) for the risk-seeking 10 An alternative way of obtaining (33) is to fix the entropy (11) to a non-zero valueŜ, and then minimize the average loss n k=1 p k ε k . Nowβ in (33) is defined from a fixed value of entropy. In the context of our problem this way of looking at (33) is not adequate, since for us it is important that E is an independent variable, decided by the agent. However, in a different setting this way of looking at (33) led to a definition of risk [56] . agent, where changing any loss ε k under a fixed E will changeβ:
where the derivative is taken under a constant E. Hence all the probabilities {p l } n l=1 will generally change including when changing ε k . Ratiosp l /p m = e −β(ε l −εm) , where l = k and m = k, will change as well. This corresponds with the fact that there is a single maximum entropy solution (33) , while the entropy minimization produces several competing local minima.
Another important difference between probabilities obtained from the maximized versus minimized entropy is that in the maximum entropy situation, as seen from (33) 
For the entropy minimizing situation this is not neccesarily the case, as implied by (25), and as seen more explicitly below in (44) (45) (46) . Due to this feature the entropy minimizing solution is capable of detecting even small differences between the losses. This is also one reason we insisted on strict inequalities in (5) . The maximized entropy is expressed asŜ
This implies
where we employed
Eq. (37) shows that forβ ≥ 0 (which is assumed here),Ŝ is an increasing function of E; cf. (30) . Likewise, one can show thatŜ(E) is a concave function of E: (31) . Now using (36, 34) we find
It is seen that (38) is negative for β ≥ 0; cf. (15) . Hence the uncertaintyŜ decreases if one of the losses increases for a fixed E. A similar feature holds as well for the minimized entropy in (26):
Inequality (39) follows from α < β (by definition of S {αβ} ), from ∂λα ∂εγ E ≥ 0 (which can be shown easily from (24)), and from ∂S {αβ} ∂ν αβ ≤ 0, which is seen from (30) . Eqs. (38, 39) imply an interesting feature of entropy optimization that we explore below in more detail. A large loss ε γ tends to be relevant (irrelevant) for entropy minimization (maximization), since it decreases the entropy.
Finally, we recall that there is a well-known freedom associated with the definition of losses ε k [1] :
where a > 0 and b is arbitrary. Eq. (40) reflects the natural uncertainty related to the units and the zero level in measuring the losses (as well as utilities). It is clear that the probabilities and entropies of both entropy minimization and entropy maximization do hold (40) ; see in this context (24, 26, 27) and (33) and note that under (40) E also changes as E → aE + b.
V. SIMPLEST EXAMPLES OF ENTROPY OPTIMIZATION
Let us now study in detail the n = 3 situation (32): this is the simplest case that illustrates the difference between the maximum entropy and minimum entropy set-ups, because for n = 2 the probabilities p 1 and p 2 = 1 − p 1 are uniquely determined by the contraint (3). Eqs. (18, 24) imply
Recall that within {1 2} only two smallest losses get non-zero probabilities; {2 3} prescribes equal probabilities to those two smallest losses, while {1 3} gives equal probabilities to the two highest loss actions. Using the freedom provided by (40) we fixed ε 1 = 0 and ε 3 = 1; hence 0 < ε 2 < 1. Now (42-43) simplify as follows:
It is seen that (45) and (46) do not coincide with each other for ε 2 → ε 1 + 0 (ε 1 = 0); cf. the discussion around (35) . For various parameter regimes we shall now compare the behavior of the risk-averse (entropy-minimizing) agent with the risk-seeking (entropy-maximizing) one. Everywhere, such comparisons are made for the same values of {ε k } n k=1 and the same value of E (utility invested into adaptation). Fig. 1 displays the entropies S {12}∨{23} (E) and S {13} (E) for a representative set of parameters; see (32) . It is seen that for ε 1 ≈ ε 2 the global minimum is always {1 3}; cf. Fig. 1 . This implies that the risk-averse agent does care for extreme actions with a relatively large loss ε 3 .
Note that for the same configuration ε 1 ≈ ε 2 ≪ ε 3 = 1, the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (33) for the risk-seeking agent produce a rather different result:p 1 ≃p 2 ≫p 3 . Hence the risk-seeking agent ignores the action with the largest loss; cf. Fig. 2 .
Let us now study the opposite case ε 1 ≪ ε 2 ≈ ε 3 = 1. Now for a smaller E the global minimum of entropy is {1 2}; see Fig. 1 . As seen from (41), ε 3 is now given zero probability: p 3 = 0, i.e. having two possibilities ε 2 and ε 3 with comparable high losses ε 2 ε 3 , the agent prefers the lesser of two evils. In contrast, the entropy-maximizing agent will take these option with nearly equal probabilities. For larger values of E, the global minimum is {2 3}, where all probabilities are non-zero, but p 1 = p 2 ; see (42) and Figs. 1 and 3 . The probability for the action with the (intermediate) loss ε 2 is as large as for the least-loss action: p 2 = p 1 . Thus we can say that the entropy-minimizing agent is cautious, while the entropy-maximizing one is risky and careless.
So far we studied cases ε 1 ≈ ε 2 ≪ ε 3 = 1 and ε 1 ≪ ε 2 ≈ ε 3 = 1, where one candidate solution-respectively, {13} and {12} ∨ {23}-provides the global entropy minimum for all values of E. Now we turn to studying cases, where ε 1 ≈ ε 2 and ε 3 ≈ ε 2 , and where transitions between different local minima are possible when changing E; see Fig. 1 with the case ε 2 = 0.33. For a sufficiently small E the global minimum is {1 3}. But for E > 0.15, the global minimum becomes {1 2}. This transition from one regime to another is continuous in terms entropy, but discontinuous in terms of probabilities for various actions, as seen from (41) (42) (43) . The transition at E ≤ 0.15 is against naive intuition, because with a larger average loss E the agent neglects the action ε 3 , which is related to the highest loss. Here the agent who invests less into adaptation tends to account more for extreme events. This is however not the end of the story: at E = 0.165 (and ε 2 = 0.33) the solution {1 2} continuously (both in terms of entropy and probabilities) changes to {2 3}. This is a natural transition: for E > 0.165, the solution {1 2} does not exist anymore, since it cannot hold the constraint E = p 2 ε 2 ; cf. (29) . But eventually, for E > 0.18, the global minimum is back from {2 3} to {1 3} (reentrance). The probabilities of the solution {1 3} stay almost constant in the whole interval 0.15 ≤ E ≤ 0.18. Note that the reentrance effect persists up to ε 2 ≤ 0.45. For 0.68 > ε 2 > 0. 45 (not shown on figures) the reentrance behavior is absent, there is only a single transition from {1 3} to {1 2} upon increasing E. Eventually, for 0.68 < ε 2 the global entropy minimum is always {1 2} ∨ {2 3}, and we revert to the studied regime ε 1 ≪ ε 2 ≈ ε 3 = 1.
We stress that neither of the above effects is seen for the risk-seeking agent, because in this situation probabilities (33) are unique and depend smoothly on the parameters involved. This has to do with the fact that (33) was obtained via maximization of a concave function in a convex set, which generically produces unique and well-behaved results [12] . Possible non-uniqueness of the Gibbs-Boltzmann probabilities (33) can show up only in the thermodynamic limit n → ∞ for specific systems that can be subject to phase-transitions. (We however refrain from considering the n → ∞ case.)
Let us now discuss the above effects in terms of cognitive dissonance [44, 45] . It is characterized (among others) by following features: (i) people do not support widely different opinions, intentions or beliefs. They tend to get rid most of one of them in favour of one (opinion, intention or belief).
(ii) The more energy and/or effort is invested into the opinion (intention or belief) formation, the more narrow it tends to become 11 . Analogues of these features are seen above: under increasing the invested utility E, the agent moves abruptly from one set of probabilities to another, e.g. from {1 3} to {1 2}. Moreover, the latter regime is more narrow in the sense that the probability of the action with loss ε 3 is explicitly zero: p 3 = 0. In this context, recall the analogy between the loss and energy; cf. after (4). Thus we conclude that the entropy-minimizing agent does show features of cognitive dissonance.
We turn to the entropy-minimizing scenarios for n = 4. We do so briefly, because though n = 4 is richer then n = 3, it does not offer conceptual novelties. Here we also fix ε 1 = 0 and ε 4 = 1 [cf. (40) ], and we are left with two parameters: 0 < ε 2 ≤ ε 3 < 1. For ε 2 ≈ ε 3 ≈ 1 the global minimum of entropy is provided by the solution {12} ∨ {23} ∨ {34}. It has the same meaning as above: among actions of comparable loss the risk-minimizing agent chooses the one with the lowest loss (i.e. p 2 > 0, but p 3 = p 4 = 0) for ǫ 1 ≤ E ≤ ǫ 2 . Now this solution does not exist for ǫ 2 ≤ E ≤ ǫ 3 . In this regime the agent takes the solution {23}, where p 2 > 0, p 3 > 0, but p 4 = 0 etc. For ε 2 ≈ ε 3 ≪ 1 the global minimum is {14}, as expected. Now p 2 = p 3 = p 4 > 0. These two regimes are similar to those for n = 3. For ε 1 ≈ ε 2 ≪ ε 3 ≈ ε 4 the global minimum {14} for a relatively low E changes to {13} ∨ {34} for a large E. Finally when both ε 2 and ε 3 are close to 0.5, there is a sequence of transitions from one solution to another, such that every candidate solution becomes a global minimum for a certain E; e.g. for ε 2 = 0.4 and ε 3 = 0.5 we observe the following transitions upon increasing E: {14} → {12} → {24} → {23} → {34}.
VI. SUMMARY
An agent choosing between several actions should not exclusively focus on the least-loss action, because this is not adaptive (and not creative). The agent should also explore actions with non-minimal losses, and not only exploit the action with the minimal loss. This is the known exploration-exploitation trade-off. However, it is not generally known how this exploration is to be realized.
Here worked out one possibility, where the exploration goes via risk-optimization, a heuristic rule that people frequently apply in uncertain situations. Both risk-minimization (aversion) and risk-maximization are seen in controlling experiments with people gambling on uncertain monetary outcomes [11] , where the majority of human subjects are risk-averse if they have to choose between sufficiently large (vs. small) monetary gains [11] . In contrast, they are risk-seeking if subject to sure losses. We take the risk-optimization as a general heuristic principle that can help to define prior probabilities of various choices, and we show that-for the situation we consider-it can be related to maximization (risk-seeking) or minimization (risk-aversion) of entropy. This is not the only formalization of the notion of risk (cf. [16] [17] [18] ), but it is perhaps the most natural one given several different axiomatic routes by which it emerges; see section II.
While the entropy maximization is a well-known rule in probabilistic inference [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , the entropy minimization is an under-explored idea; though see [19, 21, 25, 26, 42, 43] . We show that this method can lead to useful predictions, e.g. it recovers (under definite conditions) the ǫ-greedy probability known in reinforced learning theory [3] . Our main result is that the entropy-minimizing agent (in contrast to the entropy-maximizing one) shows certain aspects of intelligent behavior: accounting for extreme actions and choosing the best alternative among two comparable ones. Such an agent also demonstrates features of cognitive dissonance.
We mention that maximizing the entropy of probability paths was proposed as a scheme for the emergence of intelligent behavior [46] . Though the mathematical details of the original proposal are unclear [47] , the proposal was generalized to social collective systems [48] , and formalized within the convex analysis [49] . We stress however that within the set-up studied here, the entropy maximization did not show features of intelligent behavior. Further work is needed to connect the presented research with the one reported in [46, 48, 49] . There are also proposals of employing entropy minimization for improving the performance of machine learning algorithms [50] . Future research may clarify relations of this proposal with the presented results.
Another pertinent issue is that the optimization of entropy (11) [53] . For a → 1 we are back to the ordinary entropy (11), while for a → 0 we get H a → ln n (H a is a decreasing function of a). Hence for a small a the agent who employs H a as a measure of uncertainty will tend to see almost all probabilities as maximally uncertain (risky). In contrast, for a → ∞, we get H a → − ln p max , where p max = max k [p k ] is the maximal probability (assuming for simplicity that it is unique). Admittedly, − ln p max still measures uncertainty, but in a rather weak sense; cf. (8) with k = 1. Hence a in the Rényi entropy can measure the degree of risk-aversion or risk-seeking. Further exploration of this idea will be reported elsewhere. The locally minimal entropies S {12}∨{23} (E) (red curves) and S {13} (E) (blue curves) as functions of E for n = 3; see (32) . Using (40) we fixed for losses: ε1 = 0, 0 < ε2 < 1, and ε3 = 1. Dotted curves: ε2 = 0.1. The blue curve is always lower: S {12}∨{23} (E) > S {13} (E); hence the local minimum {13} is the global entropy minimum. Full curves: ε2 = 0.33. Now the blue and red curves intersect two times: the local minimum {1 3} is not the global one for 0.15 ≤ E ≤ 0.18. The transition from {1 2} to {2 3} takes place at E = 0.165. Dashed curves: ε2 = 0.8. Now the red curve is always lower, S {12}∨{23} (E) < S {13} (E), meaning that the solution {12} ∨ {23} is the global minimum. Fig. 2 , but now ε1 = 0, ε2 = 0.8 and ε3 = 1. Dotted curves refer to the solution {12} ∨ {23} [see (45) ], which is now the global minimum: p1 (black), p2 (magenta; note that p2 = p3 for E ≥ ǫ2 = ε 2 2 = 0.4), and p3 (green; we have p3 = 0 for E ≤ ǫ2 = ε 2 2 = 0.4).
